No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the Arab Spring' by Hollis, R.
Hollis, R. (2012). No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the Arab Spring'. 
International Affairs, 88(1), pp. 81-94. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01058.x 
City Research Online
Original citation: Hollis, R. (2012). No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of 
the Arab Spring'. International Affairs, 88(1), pp. 81-94. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01058.x 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12502/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Hollis, R (2012) ‘No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis 
of the Arab Spring’ International Affairs 88(1), 81-94. 
 





The argument advanced here is that EU policies helped to trigger the so-called 
Arab Spring, not by intention but by default. This contention is advanced through 
an examination of four strands of EU policy towards those countries designated 
as Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) under the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership Programme (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
namely: trade and economic development, political reform, security cooperation 
and migration control. What emerges is not just that the EU has departed from its 
own normative principles and aspirations for Arab reform in some instances, but 
that it has consistently prioritized European security interests over ‘shared 
prosperity’ and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. The net result is a 
set of structured, institutionalized and securitized relationships which will be 
difficult to reconfigure and will not help Arab reformers attain their goals. 
 
 
Given the gravity of the debt crisis that overtook the euro-zone and thence the 
EU in autumn 2011, it may seem curious that Europeans regard the EU 
experience as something to be emulated. Nevertheless, for two decades the EU 
has sought to ‘export’ its model of liberal economics and democracy to its 
neighbours—or so, at least, EU members have claimed. 
 
EU initiatives for promoting reform in neighbouring Arab countries have 
consistently featured accountable government, the rule of law, freedom of 
expression and assembly, and respect for human rights. EU members espouse 
democracy as one of their core values, and democracy promotion has been 
embraced by the EU as a central facet of its policies towards its neighbours. 
Consequently, when in Tunisia in December 2010, and within a couple of months 
in Egypt, then in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen and Syria, the people came 
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out onto the streets in the name of freedom, dignity and justice, it would seem 
logical for the EU to view this ‘Arab Spring’ as a vindication of its policies and a 
welcome advancement of its goals. 
 
In its formal pronouncements and new initiatives the EU has indeed welcomed 
the ‘Arab Spring’,1 and has said that it wants to be on the side of the people in 
their call for freedom. It even goes so far as to acknowledge that its policies 
hitherto need revisiting, and that there should be more outreach to Arab civil 
society as opposed to government-to-government relations.2 However, on closer 
examination it is evident that the EU has more to answer for than its members 
are prepared to recognize, and that the eruption of the Arab revolts has actually 
demonstrated the failure of EU policies. 
 
For over two decades the EU has been promoting and justifying its policies on 
the grounds that they will help create ‘shared prosperity’ and more jobs for all the 
countries of the Mediterranean. Yet persistent and gross disparities in wealth and 
high unemployment were among the grievances that triggered the Arab revolts in 
2010–2011. And, while declaring its commitment to promoting human rights and 
democracy, by its actions the EU has favoured regimes and practices that 
ultimately proved intolerable to a broad stratum of Arab society. 
 
What follows is an examination of successive and overlapping EU initiatives with 
respect to Europe’s Arab neighbours around the Mediterranean in order to 
                                            
1
 EC High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘A 
partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean’, 
COM(2011) 200 Final, Brussels, 8 March 2011. 
2
 EC High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘A new 
response to a changing neighbourhood’, COM(2011) 303, Brussels, 25 May 2011. 
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assess the role of EU policies in the genesis of the so-called Arab Spring.3 The 
analysis does not cover EU policies towards the Arabian Peninsula states or Iraq, 
and is not concerned with European policies since the start of the Arab Spring—
though the contention here is that a thoroughgoing assessment of European 
reactions to the Arab revolts during the course of 2011 can only be meaningful if 
the EU’s role in the incubation of these eruptions is adequately understood. The 
focus here is on EU policies in the Mediterranean in the two decades preceding 
the Arab uprisings, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Programme; 
the European Neighbourhood Policy in the Mediterranean; the Union for the 
Mediterranean; EU engagement in the moribund Middle East peace process; and 
EU counterterrorism policies, which are entangled with EU strategies for 
controlling immigration. 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
In 1995 the member states of the EU (15 at the time), together with Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the Palestinian 
Authority on behalf of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Cyprus and Malta 
signed the Barcelona Declaration which launched the EMP.4 This represented a 
                                            
3
 Arab commentators differ on whether the ‘Arab Spring’ is a satisfactory name for the 
series of uprisings that started in Tunisia in late 2010 and erupted in one form or another 
in most other Arab countries in early to mid-2011. Some see the term as a western 
invention derived from earlier uprisings in Central and Eastern Europe and reject it 
because it does not capture the Arab essence of current developments. However, there 
seems to be no consensus on whether to call the phenomenon an ‘awakening’, the 
‘Second Arab Awakening’, the ‘Arab revolutions’ or the ‘Arab intifadas’. For present 
purposes the term ‘Arab Spring’ has been adopted precisely because it is the term most 
commonly used in Europe. 
4
 Barcelona Declaration, 28 Nov. 1995, http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf, 
accessed 16 Dec. 2011. 
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significant departure from the pattern of bilateral relations that had hitherto linked 
Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours in the sense that it embraced the 
concept of a partnership between the EU on the one hand and a group of 
Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) on the other. 5 
 
As outlined in the Barcelona Declaration and fleshed out subsequently in various 
procedural arrangements, there were to be three complementary facets to the 
partnership. Chapter 1 of the declaration envisaged political and security 
cooperation to establish a common area of peace and stability;6 Chapter 2 called 
for an economic and financial partnership to create an area of shared prosperity 
(including a free trade area); and Chapter 3 anticipated the enhancement of 
social and cultural ties, to develop human resources, promote understanding 
between cultures and facilitate interaction at the level of civil society. 
 
On the face of it the EMP was a bold initiative that promised to turn the 
Mediterranean into a shared geopolitical, strategic and economic space and 
through this to address some of the very problems that in the end led to the Arab 
revolts. In structural terms, however, the EMP failed to take serious account of 
institutional imbalances that would impede realization of the vision. While the 
Europeans were already joined together in a political and economic union, 
defined by common interests and values broadly termed ‘liberal democracy’, the 
same could not be said of their neighbours on the southern and eastern shores 
of the Mediterranean. Thus, instead of an equal partnership between two distinct 
blocs of states, what emerged was a ‘hub and spokes’ arrangement between the 
                                            
5
 When Malta and the Greek Cypriot government gained EU membership and Turkey 
became a candidate member they ceased to be part of the southern bloc. 
6
 Rosemary Hollis, ‘Barcelona’s first pillar: an appropriate concept for security 
relations?’, in Sven Behrendt and Christian Peter Hanelt, eds, Bound to cooperate: 
Europe and the Middle East (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2000). 
Hollis, R (2012) ‘No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis 
of the Arab Spring’ International Affairs 88(1), 81-94. 
 
Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite refer to published version. 
 
 5
EU on the one hand and individual MPCs on the other, with the EU setting the 
pace and the southern states responding bilaterally. 
 
Admittedly, the EU allocated funds to promote south–south economic integration 
and infrastructure development, in emulation of the EU model. Recognizing the 
value of regional cooperation, in 2004 Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan 
signed a free trade pact of their own—the Agadir Agreement; however, according 
to the European Commission, the results were ‘modest’.7 Overall, the MPCs were 
not well placed to form a common market among themselves, since they all had 
more to sell to Europe than to one another. Their future economic growth (and 
therefore job creation) depended on attracting inward investment and expanding 
their share of the EU internal market. In so far as the EMP promised both it was 
attractive to the MPCs, but they also faced risks. 
 
The Barcelona Declaration envisaged the creation of a free trade area in the 
Mediterranean, to come into full effect by 2010. Yet the procedure by which this 
was to be achieved privileged the Europeans more than the Arab partner 
countries. The removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured 
goods—wherein the Europeans enjoyed the advantage—was to proceed rapidly, 
whereas liberalization of trade in agricultural products, the main export of the 
North African states aside from energy, was to be phased in more slowly. For this 
imbalance the EU was to blame, because the south European states lobbied 
successfully against opening up the EU agricultural sector to unfettered 
competition from North African producers.8 In terms of capital flows, the EMP did 
                                            
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/morocco/; 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127912.pdf, accessed 16 Dec. 
2011. 
8
 See George Joffé, ed., Perspectives on development: the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Samir Radwan and Jean-Louis Reiffers, The 
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encourage investment in the MPCs, yet in the name of free market economics 
the MPCs were expected to open up their economies to European companies 
with the capacity to outperform local producers and so drive them out of 
business. Crucially, under the EMP arrangements there was to be no free 
movement of labour between the MPCs and Europe. 
 
Thus it was that the EU promoted a formula for ‘shared prosperity’ and economic 
growth in the Mediterranean which was at odds with the logic of the EU’s strategy 
for development inside Europe. Within the EU the attainment of shared prosperity 
is expected to result from the free movement of goods, capital, labour and 
services. Yet the same logic was not applied within the EMP. Instead, the market 
was skewed and the Europeans retained their comparative advantages, even 
though they anticipated that the MPCs would still derive benefits from the 
partnership. 
 
Several commentators have concluded in their assessments of the EMP that, 
rather than addressing the needs of Europe’s Arab neighbours in objective terms, 
the partnership was actually a vehicle for Europeans to try to stem the flow of 
migrants into the Union by throwing money at the problem.9 If European 
companies could generate jobs in the Arab states through inward investment, it 
was argued, then hopefully there would be less migration northwards. However, 
prosperity has eluded the majority of people in the MPCs and the gap between 
                                                                                                                                  
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 10 years after Barcelona: achievements and 
perspectives (Marseille: FEMISE, Institut de la Méditerranée, 2005). 
9
 See Jon Marks, ‘High hopes and low motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
initiative’, Mediterranean Politics 1: 1, 1996, pp. 1–24; Joffé, ed., Perspectives on 
development. 
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standards of living in the north and south has widened.10 In stark contrast, the 
only non-Arab MPC, Israel, flourished as a result of improved access to the EU 
market and the size of the Israeli economy has actually overtaken that of some 
EU countries.11{1} 
 
The kinds of formulae for enhancing economic growth pursued under the EMP 
were more likely to promote efficiency measures that actually cut jobs, at least in 
the short term, as opposed to generating them. Meanwhile, without reforms in the 
educational sector there was a mismatch between the jobs on offer and the skills 
of the available labour force. At the same time, the elite strata of society in the 
Arab states proved able to adapt to market liberalization and negotiate new 
monopoly deals that perpetuated their privileged status and comparative 
wealth.12 
 
The European Neighbourhood{2 singular is correct} Policy (ENP) 
In 2003–2004 the EU introduced a new instrument for dealing with the MPCs—
the European Neighbourhood{2} Policy (ENP).13 Three factors contributed to this 
move which, in contrast to the EMP, was a purely EU initiative as opposed to a 
                                            
10
 See Radwan and Reiffers, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; Haizam Amirah 
Fernández and Richard Youngs, eds, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: assessing the 
first decade (Barcelona: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo 
Exterior (FRIDE){?}, 2005). 
11
 See Roby Nathanson and Stephan Stetter, eds, Israeli–European policy network reader 
(Tel Aviv: Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2005). 
12
 Amr Hamzawy, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and democratic reform in Egypt: 
contemporary policy debates’, in Fernández and Youngs, eds. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, pp. 131–42. 
13
 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf; 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, accessed 16 Dec. 2011. 
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multilateral agreement. One factor was the realization in Europe that the MPC 
economies and political systems were so diverse as to require a differentiated 
approach by the EU.14 Another factor derived from EU thinking about the 
countries on its eastern border, Belarus and Ukraine, which might at some point 
aspire to enter the EU, but which, for the foreseeable future at least, were not 
considered candidates for membership. Wanting a framework for cooperative 
relations with these states, the EU came up with the ENP and then reasoned that 
this formula could be applied to the MPCs as well. 
 
The third factor had to do with developments in the Middle East in the aftermath 
of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq. When the United States was attacked on 11 
September 2001 the Europeans were swift to offer sympathy and support and 
subsequently, through NATO, contributed to the campaign in pursuit of Al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan. However, Europe was divided over the invasion of Iraq, Germany 
and France in particular refusing to go along with it, and a period of tension in 
their relations with Washington ensued.15 Meanwhile, the neo-conservatives who 
held sway in Washington during this period were highly critical of the Europeans 
in general for what they perceived as Europe’s inability to muster a serious 
defence capability. Europe’s role, according to the ‘neo-cons’, was to do the so-
called ‘nation-building’ that Washington eschewed in favour of war-fighting. In 
time, of course, the Americans came to recognize the necessity for post-conflict 
reconstruction in political and economic terms as well as the provision of security 
in occupied Iraq. 
 
In any case, the Americans formulated a vision for transforming the whole Middle 
East, starting with Iraq, and in 2004 they came up with an initiative for wholesale 
                                            
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm, accessed 16 Dec. 2011. 
15
 See Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at war: America, Europe and the crisis 
over Iraq (New York: McGraw Hill, 2004). 
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political, economic and social reform for the region—the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa Initiative, launched at the G8 Sea Island summit that June.16 It was 
in this context that the EU formulated the ENP as a parallel initiative that would 
build on their declared commitment over the preceding years to promoting good 
governance, economic stability, democracy and human rights. Compared to the 
Americans, the EU had a stronger track record on Arab reform, at least in terms 
of initiatives such as the EMP in all its facets and the amount of money spent and 
pledged to the endeavour. The EU could also claim to have demonstrated its 
capacity to export liberal democracy on the basis of its support for and 
incorporation of the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. There was, therefore, an element of competition between the 
EU and the United States in their initiatives for Arab reform after 2004. 
 
Neither the US nor the EU strategy met with a particularly warm response in the 
Arab world.17 By their very nature Arab autocrats were not inclined to loosen their 
hold on power in the name of democracy though some, notably in Jordan and 
Morocco, professed otherwise and launched their own initiatives, with limited 
                                            
16
 http://bmena.state.gov/, accessed 16 Dec. 2011. 
17
 See e.g. Gareth Harding, ‘Europe lukewarm about Bush Mideast plan’, Washington 
Times, 11 Feb. 2004; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Arabs react to 
greater Middle East initiative’, 22 March 2004, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/22/arabs-react-to-greater-middle-east-
initiative/6bjt, accessed 16 Dec. 2011; Yasmin Ghrawi and Peter Sass, ‘The political 
reform debate in the Middle East and North Africa’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
working paper FG 6, May 2005, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/WP_Arab_Reform_ks.pdf, 
accessed 16 Dec. 2011; Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors, Assessment of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership: perceptions and realities (Barcelona: European Institute of 
the Mediterranean, 2010), pp. 33–8, 49–55. 
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results.18 More tellingly, the general public across the Arab world, which had 
become increasingly hostile towards American interventionism as a result of the 
war in Iraq, manifested little enthusiasm for these western initiatives that 
purported to be in their support.19 They were also not inclined to make 
distinctions between the EU approach and the American one, notwithstanding 
Europe’s largely negative reaction to the Iraq invasion. Also, the Americans were 
accused of blatant double standards over their support for Israel in relation to the 
Palestinians,20 and the Europeans were tainted by association. 
 
That the ENP did nevertheless make some progress had more to do with the 
calculations of the Arab regimes than the attractiveness of the initiative to 
disenfranchised Arab populations. As had been the case with the EMP, Arab 
governments went along simply because the European market was too important 
to them to ignore and the ENP promised both greater access and aid. And, as 
noted above, the ENP was not a partnership, but rather an instrument developed 
by the bureaucrats in Brussels to introduce reform programmes tailored to 
respond to what they identified as the individual needs and objectives of each of 
the MPCs. 
 
Only for Israel did the ENP represent a genuinely positive opportunity, because it 
opened the way for privileged access to the EU market and cooperation on 
                                            
18
 For a discussion on the fate of the Jordanian initiative, see Marwan Muasher, A decade 
of struggling reform efforts in Jordan: the resilience of the rentier system, Carnegie 
Papers, Middle East (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), May 2011. 
19
 Roula Khalaf, ‘Arabs cry foul as America borrows their reform agenda’, Financial 
Times, 9 March 2004; Rami Khouri, ‘America talks about building democracy in the 
Middle East: in fact, it fosters mainly violence and failed states’, Newsweek, 5 June 2006. 
20
 See e.g. Abdel-Fattah Mady, ‘American foreign policy and peace in the Middle East’, 
Contemporary Arab Affairs 3: 3, 2010, pp. 271–96. 
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scientific research.21 For the Arab MPCs by contrast, the initiative was baffling.22 
It rested on the assumption that those neighbours of Europe not destined for EU 
membership could nonetheless benefit from adopting some elements of the 
acquis communautaire, in the name of gradual harmonization with EU standards. 
Yet the menu of measures from which the MPCs were supposed to choose a 
shortlist for adoption in the form of ‘Action Plans’ was drawn up by Brussels. As 
the Egyptians argued,23 they could not make an informed choice without 
themselves translating and wading through the whole acquis. Rather than do 
this, the Egyptians simply resorted to hard bargaining, and in the process 
avoided accepting any internal political and judicial reforms they did not want.24 
 
                                            
21
 As is evident in the EU documentation on several aspects of EU–Israeli relations under 
the ENP, except in respect to Israeli policies on the occupation. See e.g. 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_israel_en.pdf, p. 4, accessed 16 
Dec. 2011. 
22
 Rosemary Hollis, ‘European elites and the Middle East’, in Andrew Gamble and David 
Lane, eds, The European Union and world politics: consensus and division (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Michelle Pace, ‘Norm shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as 
a norm entrepreneur in the south?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20: 4, 
2007, pp. 659–75. 
23
 Author interviews with Egyptian officials dealing with the ENP, Cairo, Jan. 2006; 
Michelle Pace, Perceptions from Egypt and Palestine on the EU’s role and impact on 
democracy building in the Middle East (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance, 2010). 
24
 Author interviews with EU and Egyptian officials, Dec. 2005 to March 2006; 
Rosemary Hollis, ‘Europe and the Middle East: has the EU missed its moment of 
opportunity?, Ortadou Ettleri (Middle Eastern Studies-Turkey) 2: 2, January 2011, pp. 
33–56{?}; Richard Youngs, ed., Survey of European democracy promotion policies 
2000–2006, (Madrid: FRIDE, 2006). 
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For the Jordanians, by contrast, the ENP sounded like an opportunity to gain EU 
financial and technical assistance for introducing measures that would sit well 
with their own reform plan. However, as they would discover, they simply did not 
have the capacity in either their public or their private sector to implement all the 
measures incorporated in the Action Plan they agreed with the EU.25 In the case 
of Lebanon, the government of Fouad Seniora was enthusiastic to sign up to the 
ENP, less because of the intrinsic benefits it offered than because the 
government calculated that having the Europeans on side could bolster it in the 
face of domestic rivals and Syrian interference.26 
 
Overall, European hopes that the ENP Action Plans could be used to introduce in 
neighbouring Arab states the political and economic reforms that had proved 
elusive under the EMP met with disappointment. As I have argued elsewhere,27 
the problem here was that the Europeans failed to understand that the acquis 
communautaire does not embody universal goods. The laws and regulations 
involved are value-laden and expressive of European priorities that make sense 
within the Union—with all the benefits of membership—but not necessarily 
beyond it, especially when adopted piecemeal and selectively. 
 
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 
As originally conceived by Nicolas Sarkozy, when he was running for the French 
presidency in 2007{3}, the Union for the Mediterranean was only supposed to 
encompass a handful of Mediterranean littoral states, and so threatened to 
                                            
25
 Author interviews with EU and Jordanian officials, Dec. 2005–March 2006. 
26
 Author interviews with EU officials and Lebanese commentators, Dec. 2005–March 
2006. 
27
 Hollis, ‘European elites and the Middle East’; ‘Europe and the Middle East: has the EU 
missed its moment of opportunity?’ 
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undercut or bypass both the EMP and the EU.28 When President Sarkozy 
subsequently pursued the idea he ran into opposition. The Spanish discerned a 
challenge to their central role in the genesis of the EMP.29 The Germans bridled 
at Sarkozy’s seeming indifference to EU solidarity.30 Turkey, which Sarkozy 
wanted to include in his initiative, also reacted negatively, suspicious that the 
French were manoeuvring to keep it out of the EU.31 
 
After much wrangling and repositioning, the UfM went ahead as a reformulation 
of the EMP with an extended membership.32 As such, the new UfM–EMP 
represented a recognition that the EMP had fallen short of realizing most of its 
goals. The aspirations embodied in Chapter 1 had not been met, not least 
because of Arab resistance to cooperating with Israel on regional security, 
absent an end to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Occupied Territories, 
the Golan Heights (captured from Syria) and the Sheba Farms area claimed by 
Lebanon. Some schemes for cultural dialogue and civil society contacts, as 
                                            
28
 Michael Emerson, ‘Making sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean’, Centre 
for European Policy Studies policy brief 155 (2008); Mireia Delgado, ‘France and the 
Union for the Mediterranean: individualism versus cooperation’, Mediterranean Politics 
16: 1, 2011, pp. 39–57. 
29
 Richard Gillespie, ‘Adapting to French “leadership”? Spain’s role in the Union for the 
Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics 16: 1, 2011, pp. 59–78. 
30
 See Federica Bicchi and Richard Gillespie, eds, Mediterranean Politics, special issue, 
‘The Union for the Mediterranean’, 16: 1, 2011. 
31
 Rosa Balfour and Dorothée Schmid, ‘Union for the Mediterranean, disunity for the 
EU?’ European Policy Centre policy brief, Feb. 2008; Emerson, ‘Making sense of 
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envisaged in Chapter 3, had gone ahead, but with limited results; the only 
measurable impact was in the area of economic and trade links in accordance 
with Chapter 2. Yet even in this area, as discussed above, few if any of the 
economic reforms introduced under the EMP umbrella had benefited ordinary 
people in the Arab MPCs. 
 
Instead of trying to tackle this problem, the UfM prioritized a set of commercial 
projects to be undertaken jointly by Europeans and North Africans in areas such 
as energy, infrastructure, transport and the environment. Perhaps the only 
element with the potential to generate new economic activity that might benefit 
the Arab economies directly was a plan to promote new Small and Medium 
Enterprises{4}. However, all the proposals had surfaced before in some shape or 
form and most have yet to be implemented.33 
 
In terms of the structural underpinnings of the UfM, the way it was supposed to 
rejuvenate the idea of partnership looked more like a regression from the EMP 
than an improvement on it.34 It introduced the idea of a joint presidency, with a 
European and an Arab head of state serving side by side, along with a new 
secretariat to be located in Spain. In theory these arrangements were supposed 
to give the initiative a higher profile than the EMP by elevating the partnership to 
the intergovernmental level. In practice it spelled more bureaucracy, attendant 
new costs and a focus on state-to-state diplomacy rather than business or civil 
                                            
33
 Nathalie Tocci, ‘State (un)sustainability in the Southern Mediterranean and scenarios 
to 2030: the EU’s response’, Mediterranean Projects (MEPRO){?} policy paper 1, Aug. 
2011. 
34
 Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘The Union for the Mediterranean: a genuine 
breakthrough or more of the same?’ International Spectator 43: 3, 2008, pp. 13–20; Tony 
Barber, ‘EU’s Union for the Mediterranean drifts into irrelevance’, ft.com/brusselsblog, 1 
June 2010. 
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society engagement. Particularly telling was the designation of Sarkozy and 
President Mubarak of Egypt as the first joint presidents. This recognition of 
Mubarak as a suitable champion for the initiative was questionable in the first 
place and has proved an embarrassment since his ouster by Egyptian 
demonstrators at the height of the Arab Spring. Equally embarrassing, in 
retrospect, was the way Sarkozy feted President Bashar al-Assad of Syria when 
he attended the launch of the UfM in Paris in July 2008. 
 
By mid-2011 it was evident that the UfM was moribund. It may be remembered, 
however, as an illustration of how far the EU had departed from the idealism 
which had suffused its earlier pronouncements and initiatives for promoting 
reform in the Arab world. The UfM largely dispensed with the normative agenda 
that characterized EU aspirations for the EMP in its early years.35 And while it 
paid lip service to the need for resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict (Joint 
Declaration of the Paris Summit, 2008, Article 7),36 this objective was never 
emphasized. In fact, the UfM implicitly assumed that the conflict could be ‘parked’ 
the better to enable European and MPC governments to proceed with state-to-
state cooperation on other security issues, not least counterterrorism, as well as 
shared business interests.37 
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The EU and the Middle East peace process (MEPP) 
The EU does not bear sole or even primary responsibility for the failure of the 
Middle East peace process, initiated in the early 1990s, to deliver an end to 
conflict. Yet an examination of European contributions to that process indicates 
that the EU does bear responsibility for going along with a US-led approach that 
has failed, partly because that approach was flawed,38 and partly because EU 
efforts in some ways helped to sustain rather than end the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza during the life of the so-called Oslo process, initiated in 
1994.39 Since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the EU has also played a 
role in the sequence of events that has led to the isolation of Gaza under Hamas 
control from 2007; and, despite EU opposition to the Israeli blockade on the area 
thereafter, this remains in place. 
 
Clearly there is plenty of blame to go around, and there was never any possibility 
that the EU could by itself initiate and direct a peace process more likely to 
succeed than the one so far pursued. In addition, the Europeans were not alone 
in seeing the Oslo process as a promising approach in the mid-1990s. Conceived 
under Norwegian auspices, the Oslo formula was adopted by the United States, 
which at the time was the preferred mediator of both the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, and for the duration of the Clinton administration in the 1990s the US 
spared no effort in pursuing a peace deal between the parties on the various final 
status issues in dispute, including borders, refugees, Jerusalem, security and 
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water. It would have been fruitless or even counterproductive for the Europeans 
to have broken ranks during that period.40 Meanwhile it was Clinton, along with 
the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who pushed for a summit at Camp 
David in July 2000 without adequately preparing the ground. 
 
Once that summit had failed, further negotiations did take place between Barak 
and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, to which the United States was party 
but the EU was not. However, the Palestinian resort to violence in the second 
intifada or uprising, including suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, together 
with Arafat’s failure to accept the so-called Clinton Parameters, at least in 
principle, scuppered the whole process. The Israeli peace camp lost heart; Ariel 
Sharon was elected Israeli Prime Minister and presided over a crackdown on the 
Palestinians that essentially destroyed much of the infrastructure that the EU had 
been helping to build. Meanwhile George W. Bush entered the White House and 
apparently saw little value in intervening personally, leaving his envoys to try to 
retrieve the situation. 
 
At this time the Europeans, collectively and severally, were active in the margins, 
but could not put back together the process that had unravelled. They resorted to 
a policy of keeping the Palestinian Authority (PA) afloat as a vehicle to disperse 
aid to the wider Palestinian population and to counter the Israeli claim that it had 
no partner with which to pursue peace. When the attacks on New York and 
Washington occurred in September 2001 the whole regional and international 
context was transformed, and by 2002 the Iraq crisis had taken centre stage. In 
the background Sharon argued that the Palestinians were integral to the broader 
terrorist threat facing ‘the West’. The Europeans did not agree but the general 
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mood was such, especially in Washington, that their counterarguments could not 
be heard. 
 
The contention here is not that the Europeans missed a chance to resolve the 
situation. Instead, the concern is with the lessons drawn by the EU and its 
member states that came into play once a new iteration of the MEPP was 
launched in 2002. When President Bush announced his support for a ‘two-state 
solution’ to the conflict the EU set about devising the so-called ‘road-map’ that 
would outline the steps by which to achieve that goal. In the process they 
revealed their reliance on US leadership, which by then was more 
accommodating to Israeli concerns than Palestinian aspirations. Adoption of the 
road-map, released by Bush in 2003 following the invasion of Iraq,41 was made 
dependent on a change in the Palestinian leadership through the marginalization 
of Arafat. But the Palestinian president refused to hand over powers to his new 
prime minister, the Israelis paid little attention to the road-map, and only the EU 
showed much enthusiasm for its implementation. 
 
Nevertheless, in the interests of giving it maximum traction, the road-map was 
adopted by a new international grouping known as the Quartet, wherein the EU, 
the United States, Russia and the UN agreed to pool their efforts in the interests 
of managing the conflict and reviving negotiations. In fact, this development 
essentially ended any prospect of the EU acting as a counterweight to the US. 
Thereafter, achieving agreement across the (enlarged) EU and the Quartet 
became an end in itself.42 The task of coordinating 27 different positions is 
problematic at the best of times;  now the effort to do so effectively took 
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precedence over questioning the usefulness of the policy itself or the value of the 
putative peace process. Instead of asking those key questions, the EU clung to 
the formula derived from Oslo, namely face-to-face negotiations under US 
auspices, and kept repeating their desire for a two-state solution. So long as the 
Israelis paid lip service to the same goal, they faced no serious impediment to 
their simultaneous expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. 
 
As the land on which the Palestinian state was supposed to emerge was 
transformed into a series of separate Palestinian enclaves in between Israeli 
settlements and link roads, the EU put its efforts into keeping the PA afloat. It is 
in this sense that Michael Keating and others have argued that the donor 
community, albeit unintentionally, helped perpetuate the occupation, by making it 
marginally more bearable for the Palestinians.43 European aid also relieved Israel 
of the costs it would otherwise have had to bear as the occupying power. 
 
While the EU and other donors may be excused for not anticipating this situation, 
they are at fault for their handling of the Palestinian legislative elections of 
2006.44 The EU both funded and monitored those elections, which were 
pronounced free and fair. What they failed to foresee, however, was the victory 
achieved by Hamas at the polls. Having previously placed Hamas on the EU list 
of terrorist organizations barred from receiving EU funds, and in the context of 
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the ‘war on terror’, European leaders apparently felt they could not recognize the 
victors as the new legitimate government. Unwilling to take Hamas off the list or 
find another way around the problem, under US (and Israeli) pressure the EU 
then went along with the rest of the Quartet in refusing to deal with any PA 
members (except the office of the President, Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas) 
unless and until they accepted three principles: renunciation of violence; 
recognition of Israel; and acceptance of all previous Palestinian agreements. 
 
This was not only a blow for the Palestinians; it sent the message to all Arabs 
that European (and American) advocacy of democracy was hollow. The move 
also meant that the rebuilding of Palestinian infrastructure was suspended. It was 
resumed in late 2007, but only after Hamas took over complete control of Gaza in 
a putsch and Abbas formed a new administration of mostly unelected 
technocrats in the West Bank. Ignoring Gaza, the EU then joined forces with the 
US and others in helping the Abbas administration build what they hoped would 
be the infrastructure for a state.45 Central to their efforts has been the recruitment 
and training of a security force to protect the PA (including cracking down on 
Hamas in the West Bank) and police the Palestinian areas. 
 
EU investment in this endeavour has been justified on the grounds that it will 
prepare the Palestinians for statehood. However, the EU has been unable to 
deliver a peace deal (as has the Quartet), and in September 2011 an 
exasperated Abbas took his case to the UN. His initiative called the bluff of the 
EU and others—but, rather than seizing the opportunity to change the 
parameters of the MEPP, the Quartet renewed its call for direct negotiations. 
Declaratory policy, that is, repeated statements about what the Israelis and 
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Palestinians should do, and what is illegal under international law, is apparently 
preferable to facing up to reality. Perhaps worse, the Europeans (and certainly 
the Americans) have taken solace from the fact that the continuation of the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict has not featured prominently among the concerns of 
the Arabs demonstrating against dictatorship; but they delude themselves if they 
think this means that the problem will quietly recede. The credibility of European 
and American support for democracy and human rights is undermined by their 
track record on the Palestinians. 
 
Regional security 
While much fanfare has accompanied the launch of the various EU initiatives 
reviewed above, there has been much less publicity for EU policies on 
counterterrorism and migration. However, since the mid-1990s a plethora of 
structures, procedures and agreements have been put in place to deal with the 
so-called ‘soft security’ issues of concern to the EU, and for these the Europeans 
need the cooperation of neighbouring countries. As a recent report spells out, 
‘the kind of “dialogue and partnership” that the EU is promising to give third 
countries on “migration and mobility” is one in which the security of the Union and 
its member states still function as the sine qua non’.46 Furthermore, in fulfilment 
of the EU’s security agenda, deals were made with the very dictatorial regimes 
that have come under pressure from their populations in the Arab Spring. 
 
Fear that migrant communities inside Europe, particularly Muslims with links to 
Arab and other Muslim countries, could harbour radicals with a violent Islamist 
agenda was evident in Europe several years before 9/11 prompted the United 
States to declare a war on terrorism. In the mid-1990s France was the target of 
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several bomb attacks attributed to radical elements with links to North Africa.47 
Thus, cooperation with the Maghreb states on intelligence-gathering as well as 
migration control was high on the list of interests of some EU members when the 
Barcelona Declaration was signed in 1995. As mentioned above, the economic 
aspects of the EMP were designed in part to serve EU security concerns by, it 
was hoped, generating jobs in the MPCs that would reduce the pressure for 
migration. 
 
More explicitly, all the EU initiatives and bilateral agreements with Arab and other 
neighbouring states have included commitments to cooperate on border controls 
and in combating terrorism. Under the ENP, the implementation of specific 
measures for migration control is among the conditions to be met by the MPCs in 
order to receive more EU financial assistance. Thus, in the Action Plan agreed 
with Morocco, to cite one example, clause (47) on ‘Ensuring the effective 
management of migration flows’ stipulates: 
 
– Exchange of information and dialogue on illegal migration; practical 
support for activities to prevent illegal migration.  
– Assistance in implementing the strategy to combat illegal immigration, in 
particular through cooperation with the Migration and Border Surveillance 
Directorate.  
– Development of a regional cooperation formula for the prevention of illegal 
migration.  
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– EU action upstream with regard to countries of transit and origin and 
implementation of the ACP agreements, in particular regarding 
readmission.48 
 
Realization of the importance accorded to migration control and combating 
terrorism by the EU enabled Arab governments to use these issues to exert 
leverage in their dealings with Europe. It is in this sense that the EU stands 
accused of helping to perpetuate and bolster dictatorial regimes at the expense 
of democracy and human rights for their populations.49 As argued by Fernández 
and Youngs,50 among others, the EU allowed Arab governments to avoid 
implementing any serious political reforms in the interests of ensuring their 
cooperation on security and intelligence-sharing. 
 
At the same time, as indicated above, EU counterterrorism policies, and fears of 
political Islam in particular, prejudiced EU support for democracy in the Arab 
world. The EU decision to designate Hamas a terrorist organization in 2003 was 
taken in part as a result of US pressure.51 When the movement then triumphed in 
the Palestinian elections of 2006, which had been called for, funded and 
monitored by the EU, the Europeans went along with the US in boycotting the 
victors. In her analysis of EU aid and policies to build a functioning democracy in 
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the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Rouba Al-Fattal charges the EU with 
reneging on its own principles and promises, to the detriment of the Palestinian 
people and their prospects of statehood. 52 Michelle Pace and Nathalie correct as 
here{5} Tocci, among others, contend that the normative approach of the EU 
was not only betrayed by its actions, but actually served as a cover for policies 
which fundamentally undermined democracy promotion in the MPCs.53 
 
In her critical analysis of EU policies on migration control, Tugba Basaran reveals 
a much deeper problem with EU conduct.54 She shows how ordinary law and 
practices have been used by liberal states to define borders in ways that have 
changed ‘the balance between security and liberties’. She questions the idea that 
liberal democracies have departed from their normal commitment to upholding 
civil liberties and human rights only in exceptional cases, justified on the basis of 
exceptional security threats, arguing that ‘the problem of security . . . is not its 
exceptionality, but rather its banality’ and that ‘security is a normal mode of 
government in the repertoire of liberal democracies’.55 She argues that border 
zones ‘are characterized by legal proliferation rather than being outside the law, 
by juridical complicity rather than executives acting on their own, and often also 
[by] international consensus rather than unilateral approaches by states’.56 
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The verdict reached here is that, on balance, EU policies did help to trigger the 
Arab revolts, but by default rather than design. The problem is not simply one of 
omission, or that the EU could have done more to promote economic 
development and democracy, even if its intentions were benign. Instead, the 
case made here is that EU policies have actually betrayed the professed 
European values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law rather than exporting 
them. And they have prioritized European prosperity and stability at the expense 
of both in the Arab world. 
 
EU policies on the Middle East peace process have compounded this mismatch 
between professed EU goals and actual outcomes. In some ways the EU has 
helped to sustain the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories rather than 
end it. By teaming up with the United States, the UN and Russia in the Quartet 
after 2002, the EU has demonstrated a greater commitment to harmonization of 
positions within the EU and the Quartet than to the defence of human rights and 
international law per se. And by refusing to recognize the winners of the 2006 
Palestinian elections and withholding aid, the Europeans have sent the message 
that their advocacy of democracy is limited and partial. 
 
The net result is a set of structured, institutionalized and securitized relationships 
and activities which infuse and overlay all aspects of EU relations with 
neighbouring Arab states and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The EU may 
say it wants to expand its relations to encompass more contacts and partners at 
the civil society level, but that support may not amount to much unless EU 
priorities change. More likely the EU will continue to seek government and 
official-level cooperation on counterterrorism and migration control strategies 
which use the law to manage space and people in the interests of European 
security, not Arab civil society. As for selling the European free market model to 
post-Ben Ali Tunisia and post-Mubarak Egypt—that may still go down well with 
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the old guard elites, but is unlikely to be welcomed by all those seeking jobs and 
fairer wealth distribution. In any case, EU economic and financial strategies have 
now lost credibility with Europeans themselves, let alone with their neighbours. 
 
 
